**Symmetry, Necessity, Theory**

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How can we know what’s absolutely necessary and absolutely possible? Bob Hale suggests that, since the modalities are interdefinable, we could think of knowledge of possibility as knowledge of the absence of any relevant necessities, or vice versa. Thus, knowledge of one modality will be basic. Which should it be? Hale argues for knowledge of necessity. I think that his conclusion is essentially correct, though not for the reasons he gives. After criticizing his arguments, I present an alternate route to a necessity-based approach. Then, I sketch an epistemology of modality that fits with it. Mine is a theory-based epistemology of modality (TEM): where *p* is any modal claim, you justifiably believe that *p* iff (a) you justifiably believe a theory that says that p, (b) you believe that *p* on the basis of this theory, and (c) you have no defeaters for the belief that *p*.